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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (16 Jul 68) FOR OT RD 682289

19 July 1968

AD391084

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st
Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), Period Ending 30 Apr 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST SIGNAL BRIGADE (USASTRATCOM)
APO San Francisco 96384

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(RI) (U)

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1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. (U) The TET offensive generally designates the period of increased enemy activity and attacks on U.S. and RVN centers which occurred from 31 January 1968 to 18 February 1968. The offensive was a rigid test of communications in general, and specifically of the men and equipment of the 1st Signal Brigade. During the TET offensive every radio relay system operated by the 1st Signal Brigade remained in operation except for three systems which were temporarily out of operation due to direct combat damage.

b. (U) Cable damage was significantly high, however. The effect of shrapnel and small arms fire was very noticeable, particularly in metropolitan areas such as Saigon, Hue, Da Nang, Dalat, Cu Chi, and many other cities throughout South Vietnam. Efforts to restore cables were handicapped because restoration was accomplished while active operations were in progress, and small arms fire, rockets and mortars slowed down restoral. Some casualties were incurred by restoral crews working under fire.

c. (C) During the TET offensive and up to 1 March 1968, twenty-two of the 1st Signal Brigade were killed, 160 wounded, and one listed as missing in action. By comparison the Brigade had 17 KHA and 73 WHA in the entire year of 1967. Some of the casualties incurred were as a result of 1st Signal Brigade personnel engaged in a reaction force role (such as personnel of the 69th Signal Battalion of the 160th Signal Group who provided personnel for reaction forces in the Tan Son Nhut area), while others were as a result of cable restoral in locations still under hostile attack, as noted previously. In some cases casualties were incurred by direct attack (mortar and small arms) on U.S. installations containing communications facilities operated by 1st Signal Brigade personnel, such as

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Kontum, Hue, Phu Bai, Cu Chi, Can Tho and other locations throughout South Vietnam.

d. (U) The major activities of the offensive took place between 31 January and 3 February, but additional enemy activity continued several weeks. It is significant that in late January, shortly the offensive began, the Brigade was tasked to provide a number of key individuals to a major headquarters being formed in the northern part of the country. The loss of these key individuals had a significant impact on staff sections of the Brigade and on Brigade units, and required those on hand to work all the harder during the period of crisis.

e. (U) Moving men by land, air and sea, the Brigade, with only 48 hour notice, formed an 800-man battalion at Phu Bai, the 459th Signal Battalion, and furnished three-quarters of the J-6 staff for a new headquarters to be established there. Colonel John B. McKinney, the Brigade Deputy Commander, became the J-6 of the new headquarters and directed the installation work at Phu Bai.

f. (U) Within a week, the Battalion had set up a tactical operations center, a switchboard and a communications center and installed common user telephones at the Phu Bai headquarters. All buildings, including the existing dial telephone exchange were revetted during the week and all cables and frames were placed underground, making the area one of the most hardened sites in Vietnam.

g. (U) Much of the work was done during the height of the TET activities. During one three-day period, 31 January - 2 February, the men at Phu Bai came under constant around-the-clock rocket attack. Six rounds landed within 50 yards of the Phu Bai dial telephone exchange, but it was not damaged. The revetment around the Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS) site was hit by many pieces of shrapnel, but the equipment itself was undamaged.

h. (U) On 13 February, Colonel Kenneth E. Shiflet, USA, MACV Deputy AC of S, J6 (Designee) attended the daily Operations Directorate briefing and a special briefing on the Brigade's missions, function and progress. He visited several Brigade units and sites on an orientation tour in prelude to his assignment as MACV Deputy AC of S, J6.

i. (U) On 13 February, General Bruce C. Clarke, USA (Ret) visited with the CG, 1st Signal Brigade, for an informal discussion of the mission of the Brigade and the effect of the recent TET offensive on the accomplishment of that mission.

j. (U) On 7 March, Colonel John B. McKinney, Deputy Commander, departed the Brigade for PCS.

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k. (U) On 7 March, Colonel G. F. Matthews assumed the duties of Deputy Commander.

l. (U) On 14 March, BG Robert D. Terry, USA, CG USASTRATCOM-PAC, observed the communications involved in Exercise Ramasoon in Thailand for thirteen days and toured Brigade and RVN Brigade units and sites for six days. BG Terry received multiple update briefings on all phases of Brigade activity.

m. (U) On 7 April, Colonel Thomas D. Bledsoe, Jr., Chief of Staff, departed the Brigade on PCS.

n. (U) On 7 April, LTC Merrell H. Smith was appointed Acting Chief of Staff to fill the vacancy created by COL Bledsoe's departure, until a replacement arrives.

o. (U) The 1st Signal Brigade celebrated its second anniversary on Organization Day, 1 April, with BG Frank H. Linnell, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff (P&O), USARV, and BG John E. Frizen, USAF, AC of S, J6, MACV, in attendance at an Honor Guard Ceremony at the Brigade Headquarters.

p. (U) On 17 April, MG William B. Latta, USA, CG, USAECOM, made a visit to the 1st Signal Brigade, accompanied by Dr. R.S. Wiseman, Director of Combat Surveillance, Night Vision and Target Acquisition Laboratories USAECOM, and Colonel S.A. Bush, Director of Material, USAECOM. A special update briefing on the mission and functions of the 1st Signal Brigade was presented and MG Latta and party attended a regular morning Operations Directorate briefing. Additionally, they visited 1st Signal Brigade units in RVN.

q. (U) On April 18, Colonel Theodor Schweitzer, USA, CONARC Liaison Team Member attended the daily Operations Directorate briefing, followed by a special briefing on Brigade training activities by the Brigade Training Officer. In addition, he visited the 160th Signal Group and toured the SEA Signal School, receiving a briefing at the school.

r. (U) The Brigade had fewer visitors than usual during this period due to a MACV ban on visitors from out-of-country following the TET offensive.

s. (U) The internal organization of Brigade Headquarters is shown at Inclosure 1.

t. (U) As of 30 April, the Brigade morning report strength was 18,095. The breakdown of units is shown at Inclosure 2.

u. (U) Battalion areas of responsibility are shown at Inclosure 3.

v. (U) During this reporting period the Brigade underwent changes in commanders in one group and seven battalions. Command changes are listed below:

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NEW CO</u>	<u>PREVIOUS CO</u>
2d Sig Gp		
86th Sig Bn	LTC Dean B. Dickinson	LTC Henry W. Hill
21st Sig Gp		
63rd Sig Bn	LTC Elmer H. Graham	LTC John C. Stillwell
73rd Sig Bn	LTC Maurice J. Castille	LTC Glen S. Meader Jr.
459th Sig Bn	LTC John C. Stillwell	LTC Elmer H. Graham
160th Sig Gp		
40th Sig Bn	LTC Darrell B. Kampschror	LTC Marcus C. Jordan
44th Sig Bn	LTC Stanley J. Duarte	LTC Robert A. Cheney
USA Reg Comd Gp	COL Peter J. Blumenthal	COL Milton M. Berry
Nha Trang Sig Bn	LTC John W. Collins	LTC Newton B. Morgan

w. (U) The following officers were assigned key positions in Brigade Headquarters during this reporting period:

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NEW OFFICER</u>
Deputy Commander	COL Clinton F. Matthews
Acting Chief of Staff	LTC Merrell H. Smith
Deputy Director of Operations	LTC Henry W. Hill
Chief, Command Readiness Division, Opns Dir	LTC Kenton C. Gassaway
Brigade Chaplain	LTC Sterling L. Long
Chief, Plans Division, Plans Dir	LTC Walter M. Garrett
Special Assistant to Director of Logistics	LTC Donald H. Brown
Headquarters Commandant	MAJ Ronald C. Grotegut

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Assistant Deputy Director of Logistics	MAJ Joseph Zulewski Jr.
M/W Systems Officer, Sys Div, Opns Dir	MAJ Walter J. Spangler
Wire Communications Engineer, Sys Div, Opns	MAJ Joseph J. Megna
Chief, Test and Installation Division, CSEMA	MAJ Earl E. Webb
Assistant Inspector General	MAJ Edwin B. Leaf Jr.

x. (C) Significant organizational activities that occurred within each directorate and staff office are detailed below:

(1) (U) Personnel and Training Directorate:

(a) Personnel:

1. During this period, Brigade processed 3919 incoming and 4969 outgoing enlisted personnel as follows:

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1ST</u> <u>QUARTER</u>
	IN/OUT	IN/OUT	IN/OUT	IN/OUT	IN/OUT
Bde HQ (incl 194th MP Co)	199/122	84/70	31/60	314/252	127/366
2d Sig Gp	163/562	249/527	451/456	863/1645	443/961
21st Sig Gp	608/410	648/581	334/463	1590/1454	1569/1685
29th Sig Gp	41/70	49/51	87/80	177/201	89/363
160th Sig Gp	44/216	133/288	97/284	274/788	199/465
USA Reg Comm Gp	92/190	353/327	256/112	701/629	731/753
	<u>1147/1570</u>	<u>1516/1944</u>	<u>1256/1455</u>	<u>3919/4969</u>	<u>3158/4593</u>

2. For the quarter, enlisted promotion allocations were distributed as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bde HQ (incl 194th MP Co)	0	0	3	3	40	78	124
2d Sig Gp	0	2	5	66	225	690	988

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>E9</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
21st Sig Gp	1	0	6	104	895	885	1,891
29th Sig Gp	1	9	9	10	178	116	323
160th Sig Gp	0	0	0	0	208	830	1,038
USA Reg Comm Gp	0	6	5	78	378	601	<u>1,068</u> 5,432

3. During the quarter, 5042 air spaces were utilized by this command for RVN personnel rotating upon completion of foreign service tours.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>LAST QUARTER</u>
Bde HQ (incl 194th MP Co)	127	44	65	236	256
2d Sig Gp	468	689	454	1,611	982
21st Sig Gp	609	553	464	1,626	1,302
160th Sig Gp	157	400	342	899	926
USA Reg Comm Gp	231	259	180	<u>670</u> 5,042	<u>777</u> 4,243

4. During this period, the following awards and decorations were approved for members of this command:

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>LAST QUARTER</u>
Silver Star	0	1	0	1	1
Legion of Merit	3	5	4	12	12
Bronze Star Medal with "V" device	4	18	35	57	6
Bronze Star Medal	38	112	105	255	225
Air Medal with "V" device	0	2	0	2	0
Air Medal	11	38	42	91	87
Army Commendation Medal with "V" device	0	5	5	10	0
Army Commendation Medal	50	113	126	289	255
Purple Heart	139	8	2	149	32

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5. As of 30 Apr the assigned strengths for the Brigade Headquarters & Headquarters Company and 194th MP Co are as follows:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>LAST QUARTER</u>
Bde HHC	113	9	316	438	458
194th MP Co	5	0	248	253	262

6. Eighty-six press releases were forwarded to news media during the quarter, compared with fifty-seven for the previous quarter. A breakdown of press releases follows:

<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>LAST QUARTER</u>
16	39	31	86	57

7. During the quarter, 1621 home town news releases were forwarded to the Home Town News Center. The monthly breakdown of HTNR's is as follows:

<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>LAST QUARTER</u>
629	497	495	1621	2,044

(b) Chaplain:

1. The Staff Chaplain conducted the quarterly chaplain's training conference on 20 February 1968 with 16 chaplains in attendance. The principal speakers at his training conference were the Commanding General of 1st Signal Brigade; the Director of Personnel and Training; and the Assistant USARV Staff Chaplain.

2. Chaplain (LTC) Merritt Dayton, the Staff Chaplain, rotated to the states on 8 March 1968. The new Staff Chaplain, Chaplain (LTC) Sterling L. Long did not arrive in-country until 15 April. During this interim period, Chaplain (MAJ) Capitani, 2d Signal Group Chaplain, took over the duties of Staff Chaplain.

3. On 18 March 1968, Chaplain (MAJ) George C. Kahl, the 21st Signal Group Chaplain, visited the Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade and conferred with the Staff Chaplain regarding a chaplain's conference at Nha Trang on 24 April. The main topic of discussion at this conference will be to finalize the Chaplain's area coverage in I and II Corps, especially with reference to Regional Communications Group Signal Sites.

4. On 24-27 March, the Chaplain made a Staff visit to the 52d Signal Battalion at Can Tho. Chaplain (CPT) Ralph E. Short, the battalion chaplain, has a very fine working relationship with all staff members and is

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a most energetic chaplain. He attempts to stay at least one night at each battalion site to gain the men's confidence, assess their problems, and have more personal contact with them.

5. On 8-11 April, the Chaplain made a staff visit to the 39th Signal Battalion at Vung Tau. During this visit the Chaplain offered a Field Mass at VC Hill. Movies were taken of the Mass for reproduction in the states on Easter Day.

6. The Civic Action Fund Council met on 15 April and approved the expenditure of \$3500.00 to the Men Thanh Gia Orphanage in Saigon. The council members will present the orphanage authorities with this sum in Vietnamese currency on Sunday, 21 April 1968.

7. On Sunday, 21 April, the Staff Chaplain made the presentation to the orphanage of \$5,500.00. This money will be used to rebuild the orphanage and for various types of needed furniture.

8. During the period from 1 February through 30 April 1968, English classes were held at the Men Thanh Gia Orphanage. Men assigned to HHC, 1st Signal Brigade taught the nuns and girl helpers each Sunday afternoon. The average attendance at these classes each Sunday is 13.

(2) (C) Operations Directorate

(a) (U) SEA TELMA

1. The Southeast Asia Telephone Management Agency (SEA TELMA) made remarkable progress in all functional areas during the reporting period (Quarter ending 30 April 68). While continuing to exercise adept technical direction of the SEA Automatic Telephone System (SEA ATS), SEA TELMA improved its capability to do so by increased emphasis on management in depth techniques. Realizing the advent of the Tandem Switch Centers, SEA TELMA concentrated on the completion of evaluations, studies, and the collection of data essential to the Time Phased Implementation Plan (TPIP) and critical to the cut-over to Direct Distance Dialing. SEA TELMA continued its participation in the monthly DCA-SAM sponsored TPIP and SEA ATS working group meetings in Vietnam and Thailand. Close coordination was maintained with Army, Navy, and Air Force dial telephone exchanges in both Vietnam and Thailand. Administrative contact with Army and other service operating units was established to ensure that all information required for sound day to day management is available to SEA TELMA.

2. The need for complete and detailed knowledge of the facilities which comprise the SEA ATS has been uppermost in SEA TELMA planning. In order to increase the volume of essential data that is readily available to SEA TELMA, a comprehensive monthly report was developed by the Traffic Branch and instructions issued to the operating units. The monthly report covers:

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- a. DTE Equipment Status
- b. DTE Traffic Data
- c. Manual, Non-Tactical Switchboard Data

2. Approval to requisition under an updated TDA has been granted. Provision of personnel to fill critical spaces under the new TDA will greatly enhance SEA TELMA's capability for more effective management of the SEA ATS. Continual shortage of officers and DAC's requires that personnel assigned work above normal hours.

4. SEA TELMA monitored cut-overs of Dial Telephone Exchanges during this reporting period at Nha Trang, Chu Lai, Cu Chi, and Sattahip Log and Port, Thailand. The newly activated DTE's at Chu Lai and Cu Chi assumed long distance switching functions also and permitted the return of manual switching facilities as contingency assets.

5. Technical assistance was provided at Phu Bai, Nha Trang, Da Nang and throughout the Saigon-Long Binh area to ensure a smooth running system in such critical areas as pre-cutover preparation, trunk termination (Plug Supervision Trunks provided some problems at Nha Trang) and re-grading.

6. The Engineering Branch developed plans for the reconfiguration of the intra-office wiring in the Transportable Dial Telephone Exchange (AN/TTC-28). Reconfiguration was necessary to provide trunking selectors in the AN/TTC-28 permitting 7 digit dialing in accordance with the System Plan for Automatic Telephone Service in Southeast Asia. The AN/TTC-28 (Plantation) which provides dial service to Second Field Force, Vietnam, was successfully reconfigured and is providing improved service. Inter-Dial Telephone Exchange calls throughout the Saigon - Long Binh area which previously required operator assistance at Plantation can now be made by direct dial.

7. A Dial Telephone Exchange (DTE) Technical Evaluation Program was developed by SEA TELMA to provide operating units with technical assistance and guidance on which to base improved maintenance. This program was implemented at the Qui Nhon DTE, 9 to 11 April 68. The Cam Ranh Bay DTE was evaluated during the period 16-18 April 68.

8. A dial line adaptor for application to the SB-22 manual switchboard was designed and successfully tested. This dial line adaptor, when approved for use will provide improved service to manual switchboards. A two-way switch, trunk pack, and a dial telephone are the only major items required for termination of two dial lines at an SB-22.

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9. The Traffic Branch, in addition to the development of the detailed monthly report, monitored the conduct of comprehensive traffic studies at New MACV, MACV I, and Can Tho. As a result of these traffic studies, plans for the expansion of MACV I and Can Tho were cancelled and the expansion of New MACV was validated.

10. A thorough study of existing common user telephone facilities was completed and four trunking diagrams (one for each Corps Tactical Zone) were prepared and distributed to 1st Sig Bde units, MACV J6, DCA-SAM, and USARV. These diagrams are a valuable tool for the management of common user facilities.

11. Increased emphasis was placed on the improvement of availability of common user trunk facilities. In the past, common user trunk outages were extremely high. Attention of tech control personnel was too often devoted to high priority circuits only. Also, preemption of common user circuits were too many and of too long a duration. Continuing emphasis on accurate reporting (daily) of circuit outages and vigorous follow-up has resulted in negligible circuit outages and a very significant reduction in long standing total preemptions.

12. A technical assistance visit was made to Nha Trang. Personnel of the 21st Signal Group and the 1879th Comm Sqn were instructed in the techniques of installation and trouble shooting of plug supervision trunks.

13. An inherent part of the recently implemented technical evaluation program is also to provide to personnel of the DTE being evaluated the necessary technical assistance that they may need.

14. All operating Army DTE's (X-Y) are now covered by the Contractor Operation and Maintenance Assistance Program (COMA). This program also provides for training (time permitting) of military personnel by civilian contractor personnel assigned to DTE's under the contract.

15. Emphasis on the preparation and maintenance of PLL's at Army operated DTE's continued during this reporting period.

16. Operating units experienced difficulty in requisitioning DTE peculiar equipment where items (5 for X-Y DTE's and 5 for Strowger DTE's) were unable to be identified. FSN's were not available to operating units and the depots were not accepting and converting manufacturer's stock numbers. SEA TELMA researched supply documents and provided all ten FSN's to operating units.

(b) (U) Terminal:

1. The Korat MAJ RELSTA was phased out on 17 March 1968. This was made possible by the activation of the Korat ASC. Subscribers not yet

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capable of terminating AUTODIN circuits were rehomed to the Bang Pla MAJ RELSTA.

2. The Phu Lam ASC was cut to traffic on 25 March with two trunks and six subscribers. By the second day of operation, the volume of message traffic had exceeded 19,000 messages. This volume is greater than all other Philco-Ford overseas switches except Clark ASC. Activation of the Phu Lam ASC will improve teletype and data communications in Vietnam by increasing speed of service and reducing the service messages required.

3. The Class IV Project facilities for the Da Nang Army Area COMMCEN became operational on 6 April 1968. These facilities will make increased capability and improved operation of the Da Nang AACC.

4. A UNIVAC 1004 data terminal connected to the Phu Lam ASC was activated at the MACV Common User COMMCEN at 241125H April 1968. Activation of this terminal provides AUTODIN access to the MACV COMMCEN, which will result in improved message handling and speed of service.

(c) (C) Systems

1. (C) In order to provide communications support to US Army elements moved to I CTZ in January, a Signal Battalion was formed from 1st Signal Brigade assets. The equipment that was moved during January, February, and March from all over Vietnam to the Hue-Phu Bai area in I CTZ included: 4 AN/TRC-129's, 8 AN/MRC-69's, 7 AN/MTC-1's, 4 SB-675's, 1 AN/TSC-48/50, 4 AN/MSC-29's, 14 AN/GRC-26's, 3 SB-611's, 12 AN/MRC-73's, 4 AN/GRC-46's, 17 AN/MSC-6's, and 16 AN/MRC-54's. Approximately 250 additional channels of communications have been established in Northern I CTZ during this period.

2. (U) Two teams were trained during February in 2d Signal Group to operate and maintain AN/GRC-163's. They were subsequently deployed to I CTZ.

3. (U) Cutovers at the new tech controls at Octopus and Pleiku continued during this quarter and should be completed by the end of the next quarter.

4. (U) MAJ Thomas C. Nelson assumed the duties of Chief, Systems Division on 11 February 68 upon the departure of LTC William C. Stephens for CONUS. Majors Walter J. Spangler and Joseph J. Megna reported for duty in Systems Division on 10 March and 19 March 68 respectively.

5. (U) In conjunction with MACV and ROKFV, arrangements were made in February for the receivers and receiver antennas for the ROKFV-ROKJCS HF SSB System to be located at the Long Binh Receiver Site.

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6. (U) An AN/TSC-54 satellite communications terminal arrived in Thailand on 29 March. Full operation is scheduled for early next quarter.

(3) (U) Communications System Engineering and Management Agency (CSEMA).

(a) Integrated Wideband Communication System (IWCS):

1. Phase II of IWCS was completed with the acceptance of the following links:

Phu Lam - Soc Trang (17-40) 7 February 68

Vung Tau - Cam Ranh Bay (11-24) 10 February 68

Nha Trang - Vung Chua Mountain (16-65) 15 February 68

Vung Tau - Long Binh (11-75) 29 February 68

2. IWCS Systems test was conducted during February and March. All data was collected prior to 15 March 68 and is still in evaluation.

3. Seven LOS transportables were ordered by the government from PCE on 15 March 68.

(b) Automatic Secure Voice Communication (AUTOSEVOCOM):

1. Two narrowband terminals were installed in the I CTZ to meet urgent requirements during Tet. These were for the Provisional Corps Vietnam and 3rd Marine Div and were installed on 29 January and 10 February 68 respectively.

2. The Secure Voice Access Console (SEVAC) was activated on 20 February 68. This provides the wideband subscribers direct access to the worldwide secure voice system.

3. 1st Signal Brigade recommendation to secure 16 transportable NBST was approved by DA on 6 March 68.

4. All wideband TALK QUICK subscribers were transferred to the AUTOSEVOCOM AN/FTC-31 on 5 April 1968.

5. All TALK QUICK narrowband terminals in SEA have been modified to be compatible with AUTOSEVOCOM. These modifications were completed on 15 March 68 in Thailand and 30 April 68 in Vietnam.

(c) Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN):

1. The AUTODIN is a fully electronic communications system designed

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to provide an extremely sophisticated, world-wide, high speed data communication system within DCS's 21 Automatic Switching Centers.

2. Government testing started on the Phu Lam Automatic Switching Center (ASC) on 12 February 68. On 25 February 68, the switch was accepted by the Government and then activated to live traffic on 25 March 68.

3. Government testing started on the Nha Trang ASC on 11 April 68 and was accepted on 25 April 68. The ASC is planned for live activation on 20 May 68.

4. Revetments for the ASC's were started on 27 March 68 and 2 April 68 at Nha Trang and Phu Lam respectively.

5. During the period February thru April 68, nine mode I BF terminals were tested by the 1st Signal Brigade AUTODIN Test Team.

(d) Design of Mobile Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment (DSTE) and Mode V Vans:

1. Due to the tactical situation and the lack of fixed communication center facilities at certain locations, it was determined that it would be advantageous to design the installation of some terminals in a vanized configuration. In order to save the Government the cost of contractually providing the vanized terminals, it was decided that the design and installation of the vans would be accomplished by 1st Signal Brigade utilizing existing and available IBM Model 1013 vans, which were to be deactivated.

2. Design and BOM were submitted to higher headquarters in January 68. Approval was received in February and BOM procurement was initiated. Although the BOM was not received, preliminary modifications to the first van were started in late March, utilizing assets available in-country. As of the end of April, the installation of this Mode V terminal continues.

(e) Army Area Communication Centers:

Pleiku ACC was completed on 25 February 68 and now provides 13 full duplex circuits. During March the Da Nang ACC was completed providing eight full duplex circuits. On 5 April 68, an interim installation was completed at the Phu Bai ACC, providing 16 full duplex circuits.

(f) MACV Common User Communications Center:

On 10 February 68 the engineering and BOM was completed and submitted for approval. Approval was obtained and during the months of March and April, procurement of the BOM was in progress. Delivery of the BOM is now scheduled for early May with the installation scheduled to start immediately upon receipt of the BOM.

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(g) AN/FSQ-75 Aircraft Control Tower Program:

The 1st Signal Brigade is responsible for supporting this program through the installation of antenna poles, mounting of antennas, installation of radio transmission lines, and the installation and termination of all cables. Installation at three locations (Vung Tau, Qui Nhon, and Long Thanh North) were completed prior to this reporting period. The installation at Long Binh Heliport was completed on 1 February 68. In March, the installations at Cu Chi and Can Tho were completed. The installation at Vinh Long was completed on 17 April 68, followed by An Khe City on 30 April 1968.

(h) Non-Tactical Telecommunications Requirements:

1. NTTR No. SCC-PVN-6300-86-68 (E) was submitted on 10 Feb 68 for a tape recall unit to be installed at the Saigon Area COMMOEN. A tape recall unit is required to expedite the handling of message traffic and reduce the handling time.

2. NTTR No. SCC-I VN-63000-25-69 was submitted on 3 March 68 for a DCS tone keying system to replace and upgrade the presently installed single channel non-DCS tone keyers, which were installed on an interim basis.

3. NTTR No. SCC-PVN-63000-102-68 was submitted on 13 March 68 for two contingency log periodic antennas. Antennas will be utilized for contingency purposes at HF transmitter and receiver sites in RVN in the event an operational antenna becomes disabled.

4. CSEMA received notification on 19 March 68 that five NTTR's for additional equipment for area communications centers were approved by DA.

(i) Inside Plant:

1. The following DCO projects were completed during this reporting period:

Long Binh Expansion	2 February 68
Chu Lai DCO	24 February 68
Cu Chi DCO	23 March 68

2. Projects were initiated to provide automatic line routiners for DCO on 18 February 68.

3. The installation of the Gattahip Ammunition Area DCO started on 25 March 1968.

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4. The 1000 line expansion for Qui Nhon DCO was cancelled on 5 April 68.

(j) Outside Plant:

1. The outside plant engineering section has the responsibility of engineering Class IV multipair telephone cable projects throughout South Vietnam. During the reporting period, Class IV multipair telephone cable projects were in progress. Engineering was completed on ten projects which required the installation of 290,635 feet of multipair cable.

2. Plant-in-place records were completed for three base support communication facilities. They were Qui Nhon, An Khe, and Di An.

3. A study of outside plant stock level requirements was completed. The scope of the study was to determine the quantities of telephone outside plant construction material stock levels to be maintained in RVN for FY-68, 69, 70, and 71.

4. A field engineering study was conducted on a new splice kit which is used to close a cable splice or cable repair. Fifty kits were used at Cu Chi to close cable damaged by enemy action. Results were favorable.

(k) Tandem Switch Program:

During this reporting period construction was in progress on eight of nine tandem switch buildings. Primary and secondary trunk requirements were finalized and validated. No installation of tandem switch equipment was started during this period.

(L) (U) Plans:

(a) OPLAN 9-68 (Employment of AN/TRC-97A) was published on 10 February 68. The 1st Signal Brigade was informed that eight AN/TRC-97A tactical tropo radio sets were to be received in the near future. This is a new item of equipment in the Brigade inventory and the OPLAN 9-68 establishes training and logistics procedures and designates the employment of the sets.

(b) The 596th Signal Company (Support) arrived in Vietnam on 13 February 68. After receiving an initial in-country orientation at a staging base in II CTZ it was assigned to the 459th Signal Battalion in I CTZ. The unit is making a significant contribution to the communications-electronics effort in I CTZ.

(c) HHC, 63d Signal Battalion arrived in-country on 18 March 68 and was assigned to the 21st Signal Group. This battalion deployed to the Phu

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Bai area to provide command and control of the 588th and 596th Signal Companies and B Company, 37th Signal Battalion. Arrival of this battalion headquarters element permitted the redistribution of units within a structure which provides optimum control within the desired strength of not more than 1,000 men per battalion.

(d) Fixed station communication facilities have been installed throughout the Republic of Vietnam and are operated and maintained by personnel of TOE units. This equipment was not authorized by any document except the bill of materials for the Class IV project. Consequently, a requirement existed to document on TDA's all Class IV project equipment. Formal action was initiated by an LOI from HQ, 1st Signal Brigade on 29 March 68. This concept provides flexibility for movement of TOE units operating these facilities without requiring a complex processing of paperwork and modification of TOE authorization documents. The action to document the Class IV equipment on TDA's was completed and forwarded to USASTRATCOM for approval on 30 April 68.

(e) USARV has tasked the 1st Signal Brigade to provide direct and general support maintenance for secure voice COMSEC equipment to be employed by US Army units in the Republic of Vietnam. In order to perform this mission, added personnel and maintenance equipment are required as the present COMSEC Logistics Support Center, Vietnam (CLSC-V) cannot absorb the added workload. A request for 179 military spaces was prepared and forwarded to USARV on 4 April 68; 74 of the spaces were for general support and 105 were for direct support maintenance detachments. An organizational concept plan and supporting authorization documents were prepared and forwarded to USASTRATCOM on 9 April 68.

(f) Manning plans which specify the personnel required for operations and maintenance (O&M) of the Integrated Wideband Communication System (IWCS) in Vietnam and Thailand through the end of FY 69 were completed in February 1968. The plans outline the organization and personnel changes required in authorization documents to provide the capability to operate and maintain the IWCS in FY 69 and the increases in military personnel required in FY 70. The increases in personnel were necessary due to the reduction in contractor personnel to a minimal force providing technical assistance. Based on these plans, new MTDA's for the IWCS operating units in Vietnam have been developed and were submitted to USASTRATCOM on 10 April 68. New authorization documents are also being prepared for units in Thailand. A request for additional spaces to raise the in-country military space ceiling was submitted to USARV on 20 April 68. The development and implementation of these plans has led to the initiation of a project to develop similar manning plans for each of the Brigade's mission areas. These manning plans will provide an invaluable tool in the effective programming for and utilization of authorized personnel assets.

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(5) (C) Intelligence and Security

(a) (C) Actions During TET: During the TET offensive enemy activity reports telephonically reported to USARV G-2 by I&S were a major source of information to that headquarters. The USARV G-2 indicated in a briefing after the TET offensive that timely reports by elements of the 1st Signal Brigade provided the G-2, in many cases, the initial report that a particular area had been subjected to an enemy ground attack. As a result of the valuable and timely information received from the 1st Signal Brigade and MP Brigade, USARV G-2 tasked major subordinate commands with the responsibility of submitting a daily intelligence summary (DISUM). The need for timely enemy activity reports cannot be overemphasized.

(b) (C) Physical Security Inspections: The TET offensive gave a big boost to the Brigade Physical Security Program. Post TET Physical Security inspections have revealed that without exception units have improved bunkers, trenches, cleared fields of fire, and constructed new defensive positions; positions from which many of them fought magnificently during the TET offensive. Many units for the first time constructed fighting positions down into the ground, thereby increasing the protection.

(c) (U) Counterintelligence Inspections: The Brigade Counterintelligence program included semi-annual inspections down to and including battalion level. The scope of the inspections included classified document control and accountability, personnel security, classified storage facilities, and local security procedures. Due to a shortage in personnel, members of this office who participated in the Inspector General's annual inspection also conducted some of the semiannual Counterintelligence Inspections at the same time.

(d) (C) Processing of ROI & Administrative Violation Reports: With the large number of classified documents being handled at all echelons of the 1st Signal Brigade, the possibility of security violations is a constant threat. During the 3d Quarter of FY 68 twenty-three security violations were reported to this office. Frequently, these violations were the result of unfamiliarity with correct security procedures or perhaps a casual attitude toward security programs and document control. Another result of the processed reports was an indication of lack of knowledge concerning the preparation of Reports of Investigation.

(e) (U) Regulation Published: SCCVR 380-20 (Military Security) 20 April 1968, was published to define procedures and provide guidance for establishing and controlling access to 1st Signal Brigade restricted areas.

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(6) (U) Comptroller

(a) Funds for FY 68. Funds for FY 68 continued to be very limited. Notification was received from USASTRATCOM that only \$19,000 additional funds (for the civilian pay raise) would be provided as a result of Budget Execution Review actions. After reexamination of requirements for the balance of FY 68, a requirement for \$397,000 additional funds was presented to USASTRATCOM-FAC and to USASTRATCOM in mid March. Subsequently, two developments have apparently significantly altered these fund requirements. First, it was learned the Military Airlift Command passenger tariffs had been reduced approximately 15% effective 1 Dec 67. Since payments to MAC account for more than 50% of the Brigade funds, this reduction significantly diminished total fund requirements. Second, USASTRATCOM-FAC notified the Brigade that after reviewing open obligation documents at the USARHAW FAO, an additional \$630,000 total allotment was being provided to Brigade. This amount appears to be in excess of that warranted because it apparently did not consider a late March transmittal of \$298,000 in obligating documents. At the end of this reporting period, a detailed review was underway of all Brigade requirements for funds as well as savings (i.e., expenditures less than obligated amount) that can be reapplied to meet the requirements. As a part of this process, open obligating documents in USARHAW FAO are being reviewed by the Brigade Budget Officer.

(b) Reduction in Overseas Travel: The reduction in overseas travel directed by DA together with the very limited funds available for travel caused a severe reduction in the amount of travel performed by Brigade personnel. The effect within this Brigade of the directed reductions in overseas travel was unusually great because of the aggressive command actions taken earlier to reduce travel to the minimum essential for mission performance. Application of an additional 25% reduction by USASTRATCOM (which actually represented almost a 50% reduction in travel for the remainder of the fiscal year because of the late date on which it was applied) caused travel to be cut well below that deemed appropriate to accomplish the Brigade mission.

(c) On 6 March, the FY 69 Command Operating Budget (COB) was prepared and submitted to USASTRATCOM. The COB stated requirements for \$5.134 million of which \$1.913 million were submitted as unfinanced because of the limited funds contained in the guidance. The principal requirements in the \$5.134 million included DCA Compensation and Benefits (\$1.510 million); LN Compensation and Benefits (\$.703 million) and travel (\$2.240 million). The \$5.134 million is divided into \$3.378 million for units in Vietnam and \$1.756 million for units in Thailand.

(d) The period 9 February to 7 March had several significant personnel changes. LTC David L. Lawrence, Comptroller, was medically evacuated to

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CONUS. MAJ W. J. Nelson, Budget Officer, acted as Comptroller from 17 February 68 to 7 March 68 when LTC Marcus C. Jordan arrived. SSG Marshall L. Haburne arrived on 9 February 68 and was assigned as office NCOIC.

(e) On 15 March, a review of overseas contract management of the IWCS program was completed under the monitorship of the Comptroller's officer with participation for CSEMA and Plans Directorates. This review highlighted certain organizational deficiencies, lack of adequate staffing, and a number of other areas related to these deficiencies. Copies of the review have been furnished to USASTRATCOM, USASTRATCOM-PAC, and USAC...

(f) On 21 March, change 3 to SCCVR 11-1, Review and Analysis, was published and effective with 4th Quarter FY 68. The major revision contained in this change concerned reporting of incidents and military police reports.

(g) On 1 April 68, SCCVR 616-3, Authorization for Employment of Daily Hire Local Nationals, was prepared and published. The regulation gives information on the Assistance-In-Kind (AIK) program and the format for requesting AIK funds.

(h) On 4 April 68, SCCVR 37-29, Accounting and Reporting for the Cost of Military Personnel, was prepared and published. The regulation gives the format for a monthly report on personnel required by USASTRATCOM-PAC.

(i) During the reporting period, a number of unprogrammed requirements for non-DCS communications facilities were developed in USARV. On 19 April, informal agreement was received from USARV Comptroller personnel that certain of these requirements would be met with USARV O&M funds. These requirements included contracting for the Long Binh manhole and duct system, secondary trunking and automatic routers for a number of DCOs, a multiple address message processor for USARV COMMCEN, and tape recall units for USARV and Saigon Area COMMCEN. The total funds involved are estimated at \$1.3 million.

(j) Audits A total of 11 Vietnamese labor funds, 15 sundry funds, 1 open mess, and 6 donor deposit funds were audited during this period. Continuing deficiencies in financial operation of open messes and sundry funds, considered to stem in part from lack of adequate command supervision, resulted in the publication of a command letter to Group Commanders calling attention to their responsibilities.

(7) (U) Inspector General

(a) The 1st Signal Brigade Inspector General conducted seven inspections during this reporting period:

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1. The 1st Sig Bde Inspector General and seven team members inspected the 44th Sig Bn during the period 12-16 February 68.

2. The 1st Sig Bde Inspector General and eight team members inspected the USASTRATCOM Long Lines Bn, North during the period 19-23 February 68.

3. The 1st Sig Bde Inspector General and eight team members inspected the USASTRATCOM Long Lines Bn, South during the period 4-8 March 68.

4. The 1st Sig Bde Inspector General and seven team members inspected the 41st Sig Bn during the period 11-15 March 68.

5. The 1st Sig Bde Inspector General and eight team members inspected the 36th Sig Bn during the period 8-12 April 68.

6. The 1st Sig Bde Inspector General and eight team members inspected the 73d Sig Bn during the period 22-26 April 68.

7. The 1st Sig Bde Inspector General and eight team members inspected the Da Nang Signal Battalion (Prov) during the period 28-30 April 68.

(b) SCCVC 20-3, Inspections and Investigations - Rights of Civilian Employees to Present Complaints was published on 7 February to implement USASTRATCOM Civ 20-3.

(c) Action on forty-one complaints and forty-one requests for assistance was completed by the Inspector General, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) during the subject period.

(8) (U) Office of the Judge Advocate:

(a) Loss and Theft of Vehicles. A continuing problem within the Brigade has been theft and loss through neglect of vehicles throughout the war zone. Typically, such losses occurred by reason of those responsible failing to lock and secure the vehicles when unattended. Not infrequently liability could not be attached, and the losses in terms of approximately \$2800 per vehicle, was written off against the government. Having carefully reviewed all reports of survey concerned with such losses, the Brigade Judge Advocate's office became aware of the gravity of the problem, and undertook a program to educate all parties of the policies governing vehicle security.

(b) Administrative Errors in Military Justice Records. During the reporting period and previously, it had been noted that there were increasing administrative errors in charge sheets, records of courts-martial, and allied papers thereto. During the reporting period, letters pointing

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out errors and means of correction were forwarded to the units involved. Also these errors would be noted in the Brigade Newsletter and comments made how to preclude such errors in the future. However, these errors increased and there were five records of trials submitted from one battalion alone containing numerous administrative errors in each record.

(9) (U) Adjutant General:

The overall R&R utilization rate during the past 3 months was 87.9% (February 80.8%, March 86.4%, and April 96.6%). The utilization rate for the month of April was the highest that the Brigade has ever attained.

(10) (U) Engineer:

(a) Troop construction directives were issued for the following:

- a. On 8 February for the Dong Tam DCO.
- b. On 20 February for the Crypto Facility at Nha Trang.
- c. On 29 February for the Pleiku AUTOSEVOCOM.
- d. On 17 March for the Tandem Switch at Qui Nhon.

(b) Contract construction began on the following:

- a. Can Tho Tandem Switch on 25 March 68.
- b. Long Binh AUTOSEVOCOM on 8 April.

(c) On 11 February, construction began on the Brigade Tactical Operations Center. Design and construction responsibility was assumed by the Engineer Section.

(d) On 5 March, the Brigade Headquarters and all subordinate units on post completed a real property inventory as required by Long Binh Post in response to a visit by the USARV Ad Hoc Committee. In addition a number of the Ad Hoc Committee personally visited units and discussed project needs.

(e) On 9 March, USARV lifted the suspense on construction of the Phu Tai DCO.

(f) On 12 April, troop construction started on the Pleiku DCO.

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2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations,
and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel

(1) R & R Utilization Rate

(a) OBSERVATIONS. The three least utilized R & R sites for the past three months were Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, and Manila. The utilization rates for the past three months were 56%, 74% and 63% respectively.

(b) EVALUATION. The Brigade should continue to realize a high utilization rate. Warmer weather at the heretofore less popular sites has helped boost their popularity. The increasing number of applications for R & R to these areas will have a very favorable impact on one of the primary goals of the Brigade R & R program, namely, 100% utilization of all available quotas.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. Commanders should continue to emphasize the R & R program and encourage personnel to take advantage of it. While the utilization rate is important, increases in efficiency and morale are more important dividends that will, in the long run, be realized.

(2) Area Religious Coverage

(a) OBSERVATION. Long trips were being made by chaplains in order to adequately cover units organic to their command.

(b) EVALUATION. It would be much more practical and efficient if a chaplain gave the necessary support for religious activities and the Character Guidance Program to personnel of a particular unit in his area when it is separated from the parent unit by a long distance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That group chaplains coordinate with chaplains in other geographical areas so that their personnel might partake of their religious activities and thus preclude the chaplain from travelling excessive and unnecessary distances so that he might better concentrate on the religious activities and programs within his vicinity.

(3) Staffing of Intelligence and Security Office

(a) OBSERVATION. This office is responsible for carrying out intelligence and security functions for a division size unit with a group size staff.

(b) EVALUATION. Required inspection, liaison, and staff visits, together with difficulties in transportation and the vast geographical area of responsibility, necessitate frequent and prolonged absences of Physical Security

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and Intelligence Officers. This, in turn, unduly restricts the movement of the Chief, I&S, who is tied up with requirements of the headquarters such as briefings, staff meetings, reports, etc. One man inspections are not as comprehensive as they should be. Lack of depth and volume of office administration precludes cross-training of officer and enlisted personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. As a minimum, the I&S Officer should be provided with a deputy and a non-commissioned officer to specialize in field intelligence functions.

b. (C) Operations

(1) (C) Quick Reaction Requirement to Restore Damaged or Destroyed Communications Facilities Being Installed Under Contract.

(a) OBSERVATION. Many major communication facilities in SEA are being built by private companies under government contract. Enemy forces can and have damaged or destroyed communication facilities to the extent of placing them out of service.

(b) EVALUATION. Under normal conditions, the quickest method to handle such a situation is to have the Government conduct an extensive engineering evaluation and prepare a complete statement of work and cost estimate. This must be forwarded to the Secondary Administrative Contracting Officer (SACO) who can issue a contract modification if the cost is under \$25,000 and if funds are available. If either or both conditions are not met, the request to issue the modification to get the contractor to proceed must be sent to the contracting officer in CONUS for action. This red tape and delay in restoration of communication facilities cannot be tolerated in a combat situation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a contingency fund be established and held in Vietnam in an account that could be used on any communication facility being built. The SACO should be given sufficient authority to commit this money on an emergency basis using only a generalized work statement which can be later refined as the situation permits.

(2) (C) Movement of Flight Crews During Periods of Increased Enemy Activity

(a) OBSERVATION. During the recent TET offensive it was extremely difficult to move flight crews and maintenance personnel to the flight line due to existing and expected enemy activity. This hindered the responsiveness of the aviation sections in fulfilling emergency requirements.

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(b) EVALUATION. During periods of increased enemy activity, or when such activity is expected, redeployment of aircraft and crews to alternate bases should receive early consideration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That intelligence which indicates a significant security threat to an airfield be brought to the attention of all aviation officers immediately.

(3) (C) Damage to Brigade Aircraft

(a) OBSERVATION. During the TET offensive, 2 UH-1D's received damage from enemy fire while on missions as well as a U-21 while parked at the airfield. Two additional fixed wing aircraft received in-flight damage from enemy fire shortly before the offensive.

(b) EVALUATION. Regardless of the type of mission flown on Brigade aircraft, combat losses and damage due to enemy activity should be expected.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That careful consideration of the limited number of aircraft and crews available precede the scheduling of missions to an area of intense enemy activity, and that ground time in such areas be minimized.

(4) (U) Reduction of Common User Trunk Outages

(a) OBSERVATION. The majority of the common user trunks are assigned low restoration priorities (3 and 4). Approximately 85% of the total communications channels available in RVN are sole user. The majority of the sole user circuits are assigned restoration priorities higher than common user facilities. Because high priority circuits require rapid restoration in cases of outages, common user channels are frequently preempted to provide a needed path. Technical control facilities are often so involved in the maintenance of high priority circuits that common user trunks of low priority are neglected and all too often forgotten.

(b) EVALUATION. Provision of common user facilities is both practical and economical. Common user facilities provide service which is available to all authorized common users and are efficient because of normally high usage. Lack of sufficient common user facilities is frequently used to justify sole user facilities which are expensive and normally inefficient because of low usage rates. Special attention must be given to common user trunk status including preemptions to ensure that restorations are made within reasonable time frames. Efforts must be directed toward long term preempts to match requirements with facilities as soon as channels become available.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. That circuit validating authorities review the current allocation procedures and policies with a view toward the reduction of sole user facilities and provision of more efficient common user facilities. Further recommend that circuit control facilities place increased emphasis on the restoration of common user trunks. Appropriate authority should review in detail on a daily basis all preemptions to insure that all possible actions have been taken to restore preempted lower priority circuits.

(5) (U) Maintenance of the Dial Telephone Exchange (DTE)

(a) OBSERVATION. Improved maintenance of DTE's is essential to reliable and responsive service. Cut-over of tandem switch centers for direct distance dialing will require peak performance of every element of the SEA ATS.

(b) EVALUATION. DTE's are operated by TOE units and skills required for proper supervision and maintenance are not always available. Therefore, technical evaluations made by qualified technicians are essential. In addition, a TDA authorization for skills required for adequate operation and maintenance is essential.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the present DTE Technical Evaluation Program continue until maintenance of all Army DTE's is up to desired standards. Further, that action to obtain a TDA authorization for the proper skills required to operate and maintain DTE's be accelerated.

(6) (U) Construction of Tactical Operations Center

(a) OBSERVATION. During the TET offensive period (Jan-Feb 68) the lack of a secure Brigade Operations Center hampered effective command and control of the far-flung Brigade units and communications during the fast-changing tactical situation.

(b) EVALUATION. In order to provide maximum command and operational control of the 1st Signal Brigade during combat and other critical situations, a Tactical Operations Center Bunker has been constructed in the vicinity of the new 1st Signal Brigade building at Long Binh Post. Located underground, and reinforced against hostile fire, it will provide a secure, convenient location equipped with all necessary communications and material for the Commanding General and his command group to direct operations during critical situations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(7) (U) Susceptibility of Aerial Cable to Shrapnel Damage.

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(a) OBSERVATION. Considerable damage was incurred by aerial cable during the recent TET offensive. Although few direct hits were observed, many shrapnel holes were prevalent in all types of sheaths throughout Vietnam. Considerable damage was caused not only by enemy mortars and rockets but also by friendly forces from aircraft and from the ground. Cables buried to virtually any depth below ground level received very little damage.

(b) EVALUATION. Buried cables are much less susceptible to damage from shrapnel and small arms fire than aerial cables and therefore, buried is the preferred method of construction in a combat zone.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That maximum use be made of buried cable installation.

(1) (U) Location and Repair of Damaged Aerial Cable

(a) OBSERVATION. Location and repair of aerial cable damaged by shrapnel and small arms fire is very difficult and time consuming. Often, obvious hits are located rapidly and repaired by splicing around damaged areas or by replacing entire spans and thereafter more damage in the same area is discovered. The result is considerable lost time in going back to the same area for subsequent repair. This can be avoided by riding aerial cable for several spans in each direction from a known hit looking for pin holes and very small breaks which usually accompany major shrapnel hits. If this is not done small sheath breaks can go unnoticed until the first heavy rains occur.

(b) EVALUATION. Many pin holes and small sheath breaks usually accompany major shrapnel hits on aerial outside plant and in repairing such damage the cable for several spans on either side of the major hit should be examined closely by riding the cable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all units engaged in cable splicing and repair examine cable closely for these minute breaks which may cause water leakage.

(9) (C) Review of Reports of Investigation (ROI)

(a) OBSERVATION. There is a lack of proper training, orientation, and emphasis in correct security procedures and ROI reporting procedures throughout the Brigade.

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(b) EVALUATION. Lack of familiarization with USARV Regulation 380-5 (Safeguarding Defense Information), lack of constant emphasis on the importance of classified defense information, and repeated overclassification of relatively insignificant defense information have all heightened the possibility of security violations occurring within the Brigade. Also, lack of knowledge of CCR 380-4 (Reports of Investigation) resulted in many wasted man-hours on unnecessary paperwork and many unnecessary pieces of correspondence traveling up and down the chain of command.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That an active security awareness and indoctrination program be instituted at all levels; that an educational program for correct ROI action be instituted at all levels.

(10) (U) Emergency Communications

(a) OBSERVATION. During the recent TET offensive communications between Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade and Regional Communications Group were non-existent for unacceptable lengths of time.

(b) EVALUATION. During the attacks on Saigon during the TET offensive, the communication cables providing common user telephone service to the RCG headquarters were severely damaged. Hostile activity in the area of Headquarters Regional Communications Group prevented cable repair teams from making immediate repairs. At times there was only one operational telephone in the entire Headquarters of Regional Communications Group.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The 1st Signal Brigade Emergency Back-up HF SSB Radio Net, for which equipment is currently being procured, should be exercised at frequent but irregular intervals.

(11) (U) Cutover of Tech Control Facilities

(a) OBSERVATION. During the cutover of major tech control facilities, MSQ-73 or fixed plant, system cutovers are often delayed for considerable periods of time, while tech controllers work on the restoration or alternate route of active circuits.

(b) EVALUATION. The installation of a tech control is a major undertaking even under ideal conditions. Most cutovers are complicated by the fact that the systems being cutover to the new facility are in service. Extreme care and attention is required on the part of all concerned with the cutover to prevent circuit outage. During the period of cutover, tech control functions are split between the old and new control, both of

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which have active circuits. This split operation further compounds the cutover problem by causing a shortage of operating personnel. These factors have caused considerable delays in tech control cutovers.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. During the tech control cutover period, the station should be augmented with an experienced cutover supervisor and additional controllers whose sole purpose is cutover.

(12) (U) Exercise of Radio Nets During Slack Periods

(a) OBSERVATION. Performance of radio nets operated to provide for backup or contingency type command and control communications tend to deteriorate in performance during long periods of little or no use.

(b) EVALUATION. Operators of radio stations become lax and careless during long periods of little or no traffic on their nets. In order to maintain high efficiency and a sense of emergency during these slack periods, additional sources of traffic should be sought to provide for exercise of the net. Additionally, command emphasis and concern in these operations during these slack periods must continue to be exhibited at all levels of command.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That additional sources of traffic be sought to exercise radio nets during prolonged periods of little or no operational traffic. Further, that command emphasis and concern continue to be exhibited during these slack periods.

c. (U) Training

(1) Teletype Circuit Restoration Training.

(a) OBSERVATION. CONUS school trained personnel receive an excellent electronics equipment foundation, but require supplemental training to efficiently operate, maintain, and trouble shoot C-E equipment and circuits in Southeast Asia.

(b) EVALUATION. A six day course of instruction on teletype circuit restoration procedures was initiated during the quarter. It was discovered that many circuit controllers were unfamiliar with system trouble shooting procedures and the use of test instruments in identifying and isolating faults in DC circuits. Temperature, dust, humidity, and equipment interfacing problems required that all personnel receive supplemental training on operating procedures and conditions in Southeast Asia.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. Teletype circuit restoration training requirement is necessary.

(2) New Equipment Training Teams

(a) OBSERVATION. New equipment training teams are a necessity.

(b) EVALUATION.

1. The TSEC/KY-28/38 COMSEC equipment was introduced into the theater during the quarter. Since these were new items of equipment, few of the assigned crypto repairmen had had training in their operation or maintenance. Training was conducted primarily on-site by the NET Team at a great number of locations for the TSEC/KY-28, and at the Southeast Asia Signal School, Saigon for the TSEC/KY-38.

2. During the month of March, a New Equipment Team (NET) arrived in-country to begin instruction of the Emergency Action Console (EAC). Maintenance training was conducted at each of the MACV and USARV EAC's. An operator training package to be conducted by supervisory personnel at the visited units was provided by the NET Team.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. New Equipment Training Teams must train all operator and maintenance personnel who will be associated with new equipment. The concept of training only a small nucleus, with which the Brigade is supposed to perpetuate a continuous training program, places an unnecessary burden on the Brigade. Resources and facilities are not available in Vietnam to conduct instruction on a large scale because of operational commitments. Complete training of personnel should provide sufficient O & M personnel until the equipment is included in MOS producing courses and replacement personnel arrive already trained. Although complete training of personnel may not always be possible, it would significantly reduce in-country training requirements.

(3) ARVN Instructor at SEA Signal School

(a) OBSERVATION. The student-instructor relationship and the quality of ARVN graduates from the SEA Signal School has been enhanced by the incorporation of qualified ARVN instructors. Such projects will also develop the aims of the Buddy System program.

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(b) EVALUATION. Action was taken during the reporting period to have an ARVN NCO assigned to the SEA Signal School to perform instructor duties. It was noted that ARVN personnel often encountered difficulties in comprehending the complete scope of training due to language barriers and unfamiliarity with technical terms. Coordination through the Buddy System Program resulted in a pilot program incorporating an ARVN NCO as an instructor, interpreter, and consultant for ARVN student personnel attending the SEA Signal School. This assignment has resulted in an increase in ARVN student personnel successfully completing courses of instruction and thus aided substantially in alleviating a portion of instructor-student difficulties incorporated within language barriers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. There is need a for a permanent ARVN instructor at SEA Signal School.

(4) Chaplains' Quarterly Training Conferences

(a) OBSERVATION. The chaplains in the 1st Signal Brigade may continue their effectiveness through these conferences and workshops.

(b) EVALUATION. Through the exchange of suggestions and ideas the mission of the Signal chaplain will be strengthened.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That commanders continue to encourage their unit chaplain to improve their work through professional training conferences.

d. (U) Intelligence - None

e. (U) Logistics

(1) Combat Essential Airlift Shipments.

(a) OBSERVATION. The current system does not provide adequate notice to the shipper of the availability and departure time of aircraft for combat essential equipments.

(b) EVALUATION. Current procedures require that all cargo booked for combat essential airlift be at the appropriate airfield at the time booking is accomplished. In the case of unescorted non-critical material this technique does not present any undue problems. However, when the cargo involves passengers or critical material that must be secured at all times, considerable difficulties have been encountered. The problem centers around the fact that the present system provides no advance notice as to the expected time and date of aircraft availability. As a result of this lack of information, this Brigade has had numerous instances of personnel and equipment being stranded at airfields throughout RVN for extended periods while awaiting airlift. The inconvenience to the personnel involved and the waste of manpower are considered to be unwarranted.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. That arrangements be made to provide as much advanced notice as possible on the availability of aircraft for combat essential shipments and that this information be provided direct to the person designated as the contact for the cargo.

(2) Preventive Law Program

(a) OBSERVATION. The most common reason for loss or theft of vehicles was observed to be the failure to lock and secure vehicles when unattended.

(b) EVALUATION. In an effort to stem recurring losses, the Brigade Judge Advocate's office took the following action: (1) notified all unit commanders of USARV Reg. No. 58-4 and 1st Signal Brigade Reg. No. 55-5 requiring that unless a vehicle is attended, it must be "immobilized by locking the steering wheel or transmission shift lever with a padlock, or chain and padlock," and requested that all personnel be so advised; (2) published similar information in a monthly legal newsletter, disseminated down through command channels at every level of the brigade, and (3) published an editorial comment in the Brigade Newspaper, in the form of a warning to all personnel to lock their vehicles or suffer the unhappy consequences. As a result it is believed that because of this, incidence of losses tapered off substantially.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Such results have convinced the Judge Advocate's officer of the advisability of utilizing every possible media of communication available to educate the parties concerned in the matter of vehicle security and financial liability for vehicles lost through negligence, and have incorporated utilization of similar methods to alleviate future problems of this magnitude in the preventive law area.

f. (U) Organization

(1) Processing New Units Activated In Vietnam

(a) OBSERVATION. The current DA system of processing and authorizing the requirements for new units activated in Vietnam is too slow. It is often the case that communication facilities and the personnel required to operate and maintain these facilities are in-country before authorization documents and implementing general orders organizing these units are published.

(b) EVALUATION. When a communication facility has been installed and is operational, the personnel, equipment, and supplies required to keep the facility operational must be on hand. This results in the assignment of excess personnel and involves irregular procedures in accounting for property and requisitioning the supplies required to maintain the facility. The proponent, USASTRATCOM, cannot issue general orders activating the unit until the authorization documents are approved by DA.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. That an accelerated system of processing unit authorization documents for units organized in Vietnam be designed and implemented in order that the proponent may issue general orders activating the unit.

g. (U) Other

(1) Reporting of Costs of Travel

(a) OBSERVATION. Travel chargeable to Brigade funds includes emergency leave, special leave, TDY for various purposes, and DAC PCS travel costs. The Status of Allotments Report received from USARHAW FAO separates only travel (OCC 210) by budget program.

(b) EVALUATION. Reporting only at this level precludes positive management control from being effective within any particular category of travel. For example, the recently imposed dollar limitation on overseas travel exempts emergency leave, special leave, and PCS. However, it is impossible to determine whether the limitation on TDY travel is being adhered to because of the lack of reported information. Further, various budgetary submissions required travel to be categorized. The validity of the dollar estimates used cannot be verified, however, with the information currently provided.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Status of Allotment and other financial reports should include data to the lowest level required by management either for internal control or for external reporting. In the case of travel, because of its special interest, obligations should be categorized as a minimum by emergency leave, special leave, DAC PCS, TDY for training, TDY to attend conferences, and mission TDY travel. Each of these categories should be reported by activity identification code. This subject is being discussed with USARHAW FAO and USASTRATCOM-PAC by the Brigade Budget Officer during his current TDY trip in Hawaii.

(2) Reporting of Obligation Adjustments.

(a) OBSERVATION. Under normal conditions outside SEA, the FAO maintaining official financial records is located close to the activities it services. Because of present conditions the FAO maintaining Brigade funds is located in Hawaii and is a subordinate activity of USARHAW. This physical separation precludes normal coordination and maintenance of a close working relationship.

(b) EVALUATION. One of the areas where the serviced activities gain most benefit from liaison with the FAO is in promptly learning of obligation adjustments which result principally from payment against obligated documents where the amount paid is normally less than the obligated amount. As payments are made, the funds freed can be reapplied to meet other requirements.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. Under present SEA conditions, the servicing FAO should routinely provide detailed information to enable the informal commitment records maintained by the unit to be reconciled with the official records maintained by FAO. In this manner, any debilitated funds available can be rapidly reprogrammed. This subject is being discussed with USARHAW FAO and USASTRATCOM-PAC by the Brigade Budget Officer during his current TDY trip in Hawaii.

(3) Military Justice Regulation and Training

(a) OBSERVATION. Administrative errors in military justice records continued to increase during the reporting period despite attempts to provide guidance through subject letters and the Legal Newsletter.

(b) EVALUATION. The fact that errors in these records of trial were continuing demonstrated the fact that the planned military justice regulation would have to be promulgated as soon as possible. This was done, and it was published as SCCVR 27-1. A decrease in errors was noted soon after its publication and should increase to the point where errors in a record of trial will be the exception.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. In addition to the promulgation of the regulation, increased emphasis is needed and will be given to additional training for legal clerks in the units involved.

(4) Timely Construction Programming.

(a) OBSERVATION. Subordinate units continue to submit routine construction project requests on an "urgent" basis for immediate design and construction.

(b) EVALUATION. A unit's construction program should be established and submitted well in advance of the start of the fiscal year. The USARV system requires three to four months for approval and funding of construction, another three months for special design, if required, and a shorter additional period to secure materials and mobilize a work force on the project site. Thus a request must be truly urgent to shorten this lead time significantly. Repetitive urgent requests indicate poor planning and reduce the possibility of rapid response to those projects which could not be planned in advance and which are truly urgent.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That subordinate units develop and submit their construction programs well in advance of each fiscal year.

(5) Lessons Learned from TET Concerning Physical Security of Billets.

(a) OBSERVATION. Physical Security Inspections have revealed that

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in many cases revetments around billets are not high enough to protect individuals sleeping therein from shrapnel.

(b) EVALUATION. Inspections at the scene after mortar/rocket attacks have verified the fact that a double layer of sandbags or 55 gallon drums filled with sand will generally halt shrapnel from a rear miss. If the sandbag/barrels are four feet high, the billets will be protected to that height. However, shrapnel will travel through the walls and out the roof where the sandbags leave off.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The revetments around billets should be of sufficient height to protect an individual sleeping on his side. If individuals are double bunked, the same rule concerning sufficient height must apply.

(6) Lesson Learned from TET Concerning the Use of Perimeter Guard Towers.

(a) OBSERVATION. Primarily from TET but also from Physical Security Inspections, it was learned that the end result of personnel attempting to engage the enemy from perimeter guard towers is usually disastrous.

(b) EVALUATION. Not only are guard towers extremely vulnerable to enemy fire, but maximum use of firepower is not realized. Plunging fire from a machine gun located in a guard tower is relatively ineffective as compared to accurate grazing fire delivered at ground level.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. All commanders must realize that perimeter guard towers will be used exclusively as a means to provide early warning of enemy movement or attack. After the guards detect the enemy near the perimeter, they should immediately withdraw from the tower and enter fighting bunkers or trenches located nearby. A concealed means of egress from the tower must be provided for the guards in order to give them an undetected exit from the tower. Also, guard towers should not be painted white.

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W. M. VAN BARLINGEN
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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AVHGC-DST (14 May 68) 1st Ind (C) CPT Arnold/dls/LBN 4465
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade
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HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 12 JUN 1968

TO: ✓ Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters,
1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) as submitted.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning quick reaction requirement to restore
damaged or destroyed communications facilities being installed under
contract, page 23, paragraph 2b (1): Concur. Rapid restoration of major
communications facilities is necessary under combat conditions in RVN.
Delays in restoration create critical command control problems.

b. Reference item concerning ARVN instructor at SEA Signal School,
page 29, paragraph 2c (3): Concur. The present arrangement of obtaining
a full-time ARVN instructor through the buddy system program has proven
most satisfactory. Expansion of this program to include ARVN instructors
for each course which provides training to ARVN students is now under
consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ 1st Sig Bde

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GPOP-DT (14 May 68) 2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Sig Bde (USASTRATCOM) for
Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ment and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

ORGANIZATION OF 1ST SIGNAL BRIGADE STAFF 30 APRIL 1968



--- OPERATIONAL CONTROL (ATTACHED TO)


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ORGANIZATION OF 1st SIGNAL BRIGADE (USASTRATCOM)

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GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES IN
SEA AS DIRECTED BY
COMPETENT AUTHORITY.




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* OPERATIONAL HQS, 1ST SIGNAL BRIGADE

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
2nd SIGNAL GROUP

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
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29TH SIGNAL GROUP


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160th SIGNAL GROUP


MISSION: TO PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS SUPPORT TO HEADQUARTERS MACV, HEADQUARTERS USARV, AND OTHER MAJOR HEADQUARTERS IN THE BANGON/CHOLON AND LONG BINH COMPLEX, AND OTHER SPECIAL SIGNAL & PICTORIAL SUPPORT ON A COUNTRY-WIDE BASIS.



101 101


REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS GROUP

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INTRA-THEATER LONG LINES
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Doc #27

BATTALION AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY VIETNAM



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